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doned long ago. An exception to the direct-tax rules is
irrelevant if the rules themselves are merely historical
curiosities. 9

Direct taxes other than 'taxes on
incomes' must be apportioned. If an
unapportioned direct-consumption tax
is direct and isn't a 'tax on incomes,' it
would be unconstitutional.
For now, I put aside that issue in order to focus on
the meaning of "taxes on incomes." We can't discuss
every interpretational issue simultaneously; please indulge me in Assumption Number 1.
Assumption Number 2: I assume a direct-consumption tax, like the flat tax or the USA tax, which would
operate on individuals very much like a traditional
income tax but which would reach only the consumption component of income, is a direct tax. Although
debatable, this also isn't an unfounded assumption.
Such a tax is a direct tax for many of the same reasons
that the tax at issue in the Income Tax Cases was direct:
it's a tax imposed directly on individuals and isn't
presumptively shiftable like a classic indirect tax on
articles of consumption. 10 The Sixteenth Amendment
dealt with the practical consequences of the Income Tax
Cases, but no judicial authority has explicitly
repudiated the meaning of "direct taxes" that can be
derived from those cases and from a study of the
original understanding of the direct-tax clauses. 11
With those assumptions, the Sixteenth Amendment
issue takes center stage. Direct taxes other than "taxes
on incomes" must be apportioned. If an unapportioned
direct-consumption tax is direct and isn't a it tax on
incomes," it would be unconstitutional.
Why a Consumption Tax Isn't a Tax on Incomes Under
the Sixteenth Amendment
We've all grown up assuming that the Constitution
imposes no serious limitations on the congressional
taxing power, and it's therefore hard to take seriously
any constitutional language that seems to put limits on
that power. (I venture to guess that few even know that
there's limiting language in the Constitution.) But, as
tax professionals, we don't ordinarily disregard
statutory language that's inconvenient. And we should

9
See Calvin H. Johnson, "Apportionment of Direct Taxes:
The Foul-Up in the Center of the Constitution," 7 Wm. & Mary
Bill of Rts. f. 1 (1998); cf. Ackerman, supra note 3. Ackerman
argues that the apportionment rule was originally limited to
real-estate and capitation taxes. And he goes on to argue that,
because of "social justice," the "American People," and the
New Deal Revolutiou, the Sixteenth Amendment also
shouldn't be interpreted as a limitation on the taxing power.
10
See Jensen, supra note 3, at 2407-08. Calvin Johnson
thinks that the original understanding of "direct taxes" was ·
even broader than my definition. See Johnson, supra note 9.
11
I recognize that the issue isn't likely to come before the
Supreme Court, given the Sixteenth Amendment, and that
one therefore shouldn't read too much into the Court's
silence on the meaning of "direct taxes."
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show at least as much respect for constitutional text as
we do for language in the Internal Revenue Code. 12
To be sure, in form the Sixteenth Amendment isn't
a limiting provision. Quite the contrary. Not long after
the Supreme Court in the Income Tax Cases struck down
an income tax on the groUn.d that it was an unapportioned direct tax, the Sixteenth Amendment was approved by Congress and ratified by the states ratification was certified in 1913 - to permit such a
tax. The Amendment makes clear that "taxes on incomes" needn't be apportioned, and that's an expansion of the taxing power as understood after the Income

Tax Cases.
But in form it's not an unlimited expansion. The
amendment was a response to the Income Tax Cases, and
it's only "taxes on incomes" that the Amendment
removes from the apportionment requirement. A direct
tax that isn't a tax on incomes must be apportioned to
be valid. It has become the conventional wisdom that
a "tax on incomes" is whatever Congress says it is, or
whatever we want it to be. In Daniel Shaviro' s words,
"[I]t is generally agreed that the [Sixteenth] Amendment does not significantly constrain how taxable income can be defined by Congress and the courts." 13 I
challenge the conventional wisdom.
Here are a couple of samples of the conventional
wisdom, drawn from works by important writers on
taxation. Both samples contain language that is consistent with common understanding, and that elegantly
make the points I want to rebut.
Victor Thuronyi argues that, "[b ]ecause people have . ~.
different views of tax equity, there is no 'true' concept
of income." 14 Instead, the concept "is by its nature highly practical, flexible and ad hoc,"15 and that has constitutional implications:
[T]he Constitution allows Congress to provide for
the common defense. Can a congressional funding of a missile be challenged on the basis that,
in fact, the missile ... decreases our security?
Apart from standing concerns, such a challenge
surely would be summarily rejected by the courts
on the basis that the common defense is an inherently malleable term the meaning of which
must be left to the judgment of Congress. The

12
For that reason, I am shocked - shocked! - to see
Professor Kahn question the proposition that "Congress cannot tax as income an item that does not fall within the meaning of 'income' as that term is used in the Sixteenth
Amendment." Douglas A. Kahn, "The Constitutionality of
Taxing Compensatory Damages for Mental Distress When
There Was No Accompanying Physical Injury," 4 Fla. Tax Rev.
128, 130 (1999).
13
Daniel N. Shaviro, "Psychic Income Revisited: Response
to Professors Johnson and Dodge," 45 Tax L. Rev. 707,711 n.17
(1990).
14
Victor Thuronyi, "The Concept of Income," 46 Tax L. Rev.
45, 53 (1990) (footnote omitted). "Under the terms of the
definition, income could mean the same thing as consumption or wealth, or something else, depending on the criteria
we use for determining tax equity." Id. at 54 (footnote
omitted).
15
Id. at 61.
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same should apply to the meaning of income in
the [S]ixteenth [A]mendment. 16
And Professor Marjorie Kornhauser seems to agree
that "incomes" is an inherently malleable term. Congress must therefore provide meaning for an otherwise
amorphous concept:
[T]he Sixteenth Amendment must give Congress a
fully vested power to tax all income, however Congress defines it, without worrying about fine distinctions. Such an interpretation yields a meaning
of income that is broad and evolutionary. Income's
meaning is to be determined by Congress, not the
Court, and that meaning changes over time as congressional conceptions of income change and become more sophisticated. 17
I've no doubt that almost all tax practitioners and tax
teachers, if they think about the matter at all, would
accept those propositions. (Indeed, that most don't think
about the matter is itself evidence that the propositions
are accepted.) In the following discussion, I'll explain
why the conventional wisdom isn't necessarily true, or,
even if it's true, why it doesn't necessarily mean that a
direct-consumption tax is a "tax on incomes."
1. The nature of the constitution and 'inherent malleability.' To begin with, the notion that the term "taxes
on incomes" _is "inherently malleable" and therefore
means whatever Congress says it means is inconsistent
with the idea of the Constitution. Yes, the Constitution
was intended to increase national power, to make a real
national government possible. But, as we all know, the
Constitution is full of limitations on national powerit wouldn't have been ratified without limitations and we don't usually think of Congress as having the
final say on matters of constitutional interpretation. 18
It would be peculiar to interpret a document that was
intended, in part, to limit federal power as granting to
Congress a nearly unlimited power to determine what
those limits are. 19
If their intention was to remove all direct taxes from
the apportionment requirement, the drafters of the Sixteenth Amendment did a poor job indeed. Instead, it
16

Id. at 101.
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, "The Constitutional Meaning of
Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts," 25 Conn. L. Rev. 1,
24 (1992).
18
Congress has a say, and congressmen should feel
obligated to consider the constitutionality of proposed legislation. But we don't usually think of Congress's having the
only say.
19
The fact that the Sixteenth Amendment was added later
doesn't change the nature of the Constitution. The Amendment had a limited purpose, to overturn the narrow holding
of the Income Tax Cases; it shouldn't be interpreted as having
repealed other constitutional values. As Judge Kozinski and
Professor Volokh state,
The notion that every constitutional amendment is a
partial repeal of every previously-enacted constitutional provision has hair-raising implications. Does the Sixteenth Amendment ... authorize a tax levied only on
income derived from sale of antigovernment literature,
or a tax only on blacks?. Does it allow collection techniques that violate the Fourth Amendment?
Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, "A Penumbra Too Far," 106 Harv.
L. Rev. 1638, 1650 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
17
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was only "taxes on incomes" that were exempted. That
term may not have a precisely defined set of boundaries - what constitutional terms do? - but that
doesn't mean that the term becomes an empty vessel
into which Congress can pour whatever definition it
wishes.
It may well be the case that, as Joseph Isenbergh has
put it, the "Framers [of the Sixteenth Amendment] ...
rarely worked on the entire canvas at one time," and,
as a result, they "may not themselves always have
understood the full import of the provisions they introduced, and even less of the system overall." 20 I don't
necessarily agree that the confusion was so great, but
suppose for the sake of argument it was. What interpretational principles would follow from that assumption? One could find similar confusion in the origin of
many legal documents, including the Internal Revenue
Code. Do constitutional and statutory provisions become open-ended simply because they present difficult
interpretational tasks? 21

It would be peculiar to interpret a
document that was intended, in part,
to limit federal power as granting to
Congress a nearly unlimited power to
determine what those limits are.
In a pass~ge I quoted earlier, Victor Thuronyi is
right, insome sense, when he argues that "[b]ecause
people have different views of tax equity, there is no
'true' concept of income." 22 But that proposition
doesn't transfer well into constitutional law, where
concepts aren't ordinarily defined by agreement. There
may be no clearly "true" concept of "unreasonable
searches and seizures," but we can't therefore ignore
that constitutional phrase.
And Thuronyi's missile example doesn't hit the target.23 He's right that a constitutional challenge to
deployment of a particular missile system would (and
should) go nowhere in court. But that's a trivially easy
case. Let's get closer to reality (or as close as we can
after putting standing issues aside). Does Thuronyi
mean to suggest that any expenditure would be constitutionally acceptable simply because Congress
declared it to be for national defense? 24 The defense
umbrella covers a lot, but does it really cover everything - as long as Congress mumbles the word
"defense" in its deliberations? If constitutional lan-

20
Joseph Isenbergh, "The End of Income Taxation,"45 Tax
L. Rev. 283, 287 (1990).
21
Hint: the right answer to that question is No.
22
Thuronyi, supra note 14, at 53.
23
See supra text accompanying note 16.
24
The practical answer may be Yes, but I want to examine
the impractical interpretational issue: Should an expenditure
that has no other authority to justify it be valid merely because Congress says the expenditure is being made for national defense?
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guage is that malleable, then there are effectively no
constitutional limitations on congressional power.
In any event, that's not the sort of challenge that
would be made to a direct-consumption tax. In questioning whether such a tax is really a tax on incomes,
we wouldn't be doing the equivalent of second guessing Congress's judgment about the military capabilities
of something that is unquestionably a military weapon.
We would be asking whether a purported weapon is
really a weapon at all, whether a purported income tax
is really a tax on incomes. In neither case should the
answer be Yes just because Congress says it is.
2. The income tax was a reaction to the perceived
inadequacies of consumption taxes. Historically, consumption taxes and income taxes weren't considered
to be functional equivalents; that's one reason we
should be skeptical that the Sixteenth Amendment
term "taxes on incomes" would encompass a tax, like
the flat tax or the USA tax, that picks up only the
consumption component of income.
Before the enactment of the 1894 income tax, which
was struck down by the Supreme Court in the Income
Tax Cases, there was a sense that the taxes that had
funded the United States for most of the nation's history were unfair: the burdens were falling disproportionately on lower-income persons. That's why a new
form of taxation was necessary,25 and, once the
Supreme Court had repudiated the 1894 tax, the move
to amend the Constitution began. Income taxes were
different because they would reach a different tax base,
and, as a result, fall more heavily on higher-income,
wealthier Americans. In Michael Graetz's words,
"More than eighty years ago when this nation adopted
the Sixteenth Amendment, achieving fairness in the
distribution of the tax burden was the essential'reason
for taxing income and for taxing it at progressive
rates." 26
! '

i'

I haven't done as much research as I need to on the
income tax debates in the 1890-1913 period, but this
much I'm sure about: commentators then and now
generally see the late nineteenth-, early twentieth-century proponents of an income tax as trying to reorient
the tax system. 27 As historian Gerald Eggert put it,
Congressional debates made it clear ... that the
[1894 income] tax was, in part, a response to the
widespread demand to equalize the tax burdens
borne by the various classes. The tariff, which
was the federal government's chief source of
revenue, lay most heavily on the poorer classes

25
The income tax wasn't an entirely new idea; one had
been used during the Civil War. But it wasn't until enactment
of the 1894 income tax that many people contemplated an
income tax as a permanent part of the revenue system.
26
Michael J. Graetz, The Decline [and Fall?] of the Income Tax
222 (1997).
27
0ne significant exception is Robert Stanley, Dimensions
of Law in the Service of Order: Origins of the Federal Income Tax,
1861-1913 (1993) (characterizing enactment of income tax as
means of cutting off far-reaching reform).

-ran the argument- while the proposed income tax would be paid by the wealthier classes. 28
Edward Whitney (Assistant Attorney General at the
time of the Income Tax Cases) explained the 1894 tax in
this way: "The party controlling, the House of Representatives, accepting the -theory that the prevailing
taxes on consumption bore especially hard on the
smaller incomes, undertook to make up the deficit with
a compensatory duty upon the larger ones." 29

The Sixteenth Amendment isn't
authority for a consumption tax;
indeed, it was the perceived failure of
consumption taxes that made the
income tax - and hence the Sixteenth
Amendment - necessary.
When the 1894 income tax was struck down, a push
for a constitutional amendment was inevitable. The
Sixteenth Amendment was intended to constitutionally
validate what income-tax proponents had attempted to
do in 1894. In defending today's income tax against
flat-tax supporters, Michael Graetz makes this basic
point about the Amendment: "A flat-rate tax on consumption would shift substantial amounts of taxes
from higher- to lower-income families .... [T]he
American people will not accept such a tax as fair.
Indeed, the Sixteenth Amendment was added to the
Constitution to redress such a situation." 30
In short, the Sixteenth Amendment isn't authority
for a consumption tax; indeed, it was the perceived
failure of consumption taxes that made the income tax
- and hence the Sixteenth Amendment - necessary.
3. Direct-consumption taxes aren't what is meant by
'taxes on incomes' today. The understanding that income taxes and consumption taxes are different
animals continues today. The current proponents of
consumption taxes aren't modest in their public
pronouncements. Taxes like the flat tax or the USA tax
would, it's plausibly argued, dramatically change the
American tax system. The goal of the consumption tax
proponents, according to House Ways and Means Committee Chair Bill Archer, is to "pull the income tax out
by its roots and throw it away." 31 That doesn't sound
like income tax talk to me.

28
Gerald G. Eggert, "Richard Olney and the Income Tax
Cases," 48 Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. 24, 24-25 (1961).
29
Edward B. Whitney, "The Income Tax and the Constitution," 20 Harv. L. Rev. 280, 284 (1907).
30
Graetz, supra note 26, at 262. "The fear of ... backlashes
... is at least part of the reason why consumption tax
proponents in Congress have cloaked their proposals in income tax garb." Id. at 263; see also Michael J. Graetz & Michael
M. O'Hear, "The 'Original Intent' of U.S. International Taxation," 46 Duke L.J. 1021, 1043 (1997) ("The Sixteenth Amendment permitting a federal income tax had ... been sold to the
American people on fairness grounds .... ").
31
Quoted in John Godfrey," Archer Keen on Killing Code,
Full Speed Ahead on Tax Reform," Tax Notes, Mar. 11, 1996,
p. 1431.
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Nevertheless, critics have suggested to me that the
,, difference between a direct-consumption tax and an
\income tax is just a matter of accounting (that is,
/whether taxpayers should be entitled to deductions or
exclusions to reflect savings), and accounting .issues
don't rise to constitutional levels. Moreover, it's possible to pick passages out of Supreme: Court opinions
to support that position. For example, the Court wrote
in 1934, "Unquestionably Congress has the power to
condition, limit or deny deductions from gross income
in order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax."32
If we were talking about an isolated deduction or
exclusion, I'd agree that the Constitution is likely to be
irrelevant: determining one's entitlement to most
deductions or exclusions doesn'trequire constitutional
analysis. 33 But this is different: exempting the savings
component of income from taxation would fundamen- .

32
Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co, 292 U.S. 371, 381
(1934).
33
But I don't mean to say that the current code is the
standard by which constitutionality of tax legislation should
be measured, and I reject the idea that anything hidden in
the code under the heading "Income Taxes" is necessarily
constitutional. An unapportioned tax on real estate wouldn't
become constitutional merely because Congress put it into
subtitle A of the code. See Helvering v. Independent Life Ins.
Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378 (1934) ("If the statute lays taxes on the
part of the building occupied by the owner or upon the rental
value of that space, it cannot be sustained, for that would be
to lay a direct tax requiring apportionment.").
Some cases that could be interpreted~as taking a cavalier
position on the meaning of income or as standing for the
proposition that accounting is all-powerful, like Burnet v.
Sanford & Broqks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931), do nothing of the
sort. Yes, the Court deferred to the system of annual accounting in a case where, over time, the taxpayer had little or no
net income; the result, therefore, was that an "income" tax
was imposed on a person without economic income. But the
case merely held that allowances must be made for accounting practicality, as thatpracticality was understood in 1913,
when the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified:
It is the essence of any system of taxation that it
should produce revenue ascertainable, and payable to
the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a
system is it practicable to produce a regular flow of
income and apply methods of accounting, assessment,
and collection capable of practical operation. It is not
suggested that there has ever been any general scheme
for taxing income on any other basis. The computation
of income annually as the net result of all transactions
within the year was a familiar practice, and taxes upon
income so arrived at were not unknown, before the
Sixteenth Amendment. ... It is not to be supposed that
the amendment did not contemplate that Congress
might make income so ascertained the basis of a
scheme of taxation such as had been in a~:tual operation
within the United States before its adoption. While,
conceivably, a different system might be devised ... ,
Congress is not required by the amendment to adopt
such a system in preference to the more familiar
method, even if it were practicable.
Id. at 365.
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tally change our conception of what income is. 34 The
Sixteenth Amendment didn't constitutionalize the
Haig-Simons definition of income, of course, and a tax
needn't reach all increases in wealth to constitute a
valid income tax. 35 But exempting savings is different
from the selective exclusion of certain income items in
today's code. The exclusion of broad categories of income items - of what everyone concedes can be included in "incomes" constitutionally - may leave a
tax base that isn't income in any generally accepted
sense. 36
The economic literature can't be controlling in interpreting a constitutional provision, but it's instructive
to see how economists have promoted the flat tax and
the USA tax: by emphasizing how different those taxes
would be from the existing scheme. 37 As the terms are
ordinarily used in the literature, an income tax is the
opposite of a consumption tax. 38 At least since the time
of Irving Fisher, consumption tax advocates have complained about an income tax's being imposed both on
the receipt of capital and on the income generated by
the capital. 39 In contrast, a pure consumption tax
avoids double taxation, either by exempting the capital, or by exempting income from the capital, from
tax. 40
34
And, as I've already suggested, it would be inconsistent
with the conception in 1913 - and that's significant. See
Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 519 (1921)
(focusing on "the commonly understood meaning of the term
which must have been in the minds of the people when they
adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution").
35
If Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), is still good
law, as about three people in the world (including me) think,
an income tax couldn't reach all appreciation in wealth.
36
It's been said to me that a gross receipts tax- a tax that
permits no deductions, even for legitimate business expenses
-may be a "tax on incomes," and there is lower court authority for that proposition. See Penn Mut. Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1960). But taxing someone
who has no net income (say receipts of $100,000 but also
expenses of $100,000) under an "income" tax is absurd. (Note
the reference to "net" in the text accompanying supra note
32.) The goal of the Sixteenth Amendment was to reach
higher-income, not no-income, persons.
The difference between a gross receipts tax and an income
tax isn't merely a matter of accounting. Permitting this
deduction or that may be an accounting issue; deciding
whether to permit any deductions at all is decidedly not a
simple accounting question. Cf Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers, 247
U.S. 179, 185 (1913) (concluding that basis or cost-of-goodssold concept was implicit in statutory definition of "income":
"In order to determine whether there has been gain or loss,
and the amount of the gain, if any, we must withdraw from
the gross proceeds an amount sufficient to restore the capital
value that existed at the commencement of the period under
consideration.").
37
See Jensen, supra note 3, at 2411-13.
38
I hate to admit it, but I'm indebted to Calvin Johnson for
these points. He's really not a bad guy.
39
Irving Fisher & Herbert W. Fisher, Constructive Income
Taxation: A Proposal for Reform 56-57 (1942).
40
.
Professor Fisher and, more recently, Professor Jeff Strnad
have argued that a true income tax wouldn't impose a double
tax on capital. See id.; Jeff Strnad, "Taxation of Income From
Capital: A Theoretical Appraisal," 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1023 (1985).

(Footnote 40 continued on next page.)
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Despite its hybrid status, our current "income" tax
satisfies the double-tax criterion for an income tax. Indeed, if the income tax didn't reach most sources of
capital, it wouldn't have come into being. In contrast,
the flat tax and the USA tax don't satisfy the double-tax
criterion; that's part of their attraction.
4. The Supreme Court for years didn't think the
definition of 'incomes' was 'inherently malleable.'
The idea that the term "taxes on incomes" is "inherently malleable" is a modern one. The Supreme Court
clearly didn't accept that notion for a long time (and,
for that matter, there's not much evidence that the
Court has a position one way or the other on that issue
today 41 ).
We all know Eisner v. Macomber, 42 which held that
shareholders couldn't be taxed on the receipt of totally
proportionate stock dividends. In Macomber, in 1920,
the Court stated that a
proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very
clear language, requires also that [the Sixteenth]
Amendment shall not be extended by loose construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as
applied to income, those provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment according
to population for direct taxes upon property, real
and personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important function, and it is not to
be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the
courts. 43
And
it becomes essential to distinguish between what
is and what is not 'income,' as the term is used
[in the Sixteenth Amendment]; and to apply the
distinction, as cases arise, according to truth and
substance, without regard to form. Congress' cannot by any definition it may adopt conclude the
matter, since it cannot by legislation alter the Constitution .... 44
Clear enough? Macomber is rejected by most commentators today, as if it were aberrational, 45 but it isn't
the only case in which the Court assumed that "incomes" had content. Consider, for example, the wellknown 1929 case of Taft v. Bowers, 46 regarding the basis
of property transferred by gift: "Under former
decisions here the settled doctrine is that the Sixteenth
Amendment confers no power upon Congress to define
and tax as income without apportionment something
But those arguments haven't been generally accepted within
the profession. See, e.g., Henry C. Simons, Personal Income
Taxation 226 (1938) ("To an unsympathetic critic, Fisher's
main point still seems to be that anything which is called an
income tax ought to be a tax on what Fisher calls income.");
Louis Kaplow & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., "Professor Strnad's
Rejoinder: Simply Semantics," 39 Stan. L. Rev. 419, 419-25
(1987).
41
! doubt that the issue grabs Supreme Court justices in
the way it grabs me.
42
252 U.S. 189 (1920).
43
Id. at 206.
44Id.
45
See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 3, at 42-46.
46
278 u.s. 470 (1929).
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which theretofore could not have been properly
regarded as income." 47
In Taft v. Bowers, the donee-taxpayer's position (that
the income tax couldn't reach appreciation in property
that had occurred while the property was held by the
donor) didn't prevail, so .that the language about the
restrictive nature of the Sixteenth Amendment could
be viewed as dictum. But in the 1925 decision in Edwards
v. Cuba Railroad Co., 48 the taxpayer, a railroad company,
was successful in urging that it couldn't be taxed on
subsidy payments made by the Cuban government:
"The subsidy payments taxed were not made for services rendered or to be rendered. They were not profits
or gains from the use or operation of the railroad, and
do not constitute income within the meaning of the
Sixteenth Amendment." 49 In short, they weren't the
sort of benefit - if benefit they were - that people
think of when they think of income, and "[t]he Sixteenth Amendment, like other laws authorizing or imposing taxes, is to be taken as written and is not to be
extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated by the
language used." 50

One doesn't necessarily have to have
an all-encompassing theory of
'income' to decide whether a particular
item is or isn't income.

I

In 1921, in Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 51
the Court had written that "in determining the definition of the word 'income' ... , this Court has consistently refused to enter into the refinements of lexicographers or economists, and has approved, in the
definitions quoted, what it believed to be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have
been in the minds of the people when they adopted the
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution." 52
That kind of language lends itself to ridicule by
modern commentators. For example, the Third Circuit,
in 1940, stated that the test relied on "some illusory
theory that the state legislatures who ratified the 16th
Amendment had some idea of an 'ordinary meaning'
for such an economic abstraction." 53 The Tax Court has
been particularly unsympathetic to Sixteenth Amendment claims. In 1978, for example, in rejecting a con-

47

Id. at 481.
268 u.s. 628 (1925).
49
Id. at 633.
50
Id. at 631-32.
51
255 U.S. 509 (1921) (upholding tax on capital gains).
52
Id. at 519; see also Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co.,
292 U.S. 371, 378 (1934) ("The rental value of the building
used by the owner does not constitute income within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment."); Bowers v. KerbaughEmpire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 173 (1926) ("It was not the purpose
or effect of that Amendment to bring any new subject within
the taxing power.").
53
Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 115 F.2d 86, 87 (3d Cir.
1940) (characterizing Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka).
48
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stitutional challenge to section 83,54 the court referred
to a "long-abandoned" Supreme Court effort to
"fashion a concept of income." 55
The Court may not have considered the meaning of
"income~" for a long time, but I'm not sure that the
effort has actually been abandoned, 56 or if it was abandoned, what that means. One doesn't necessarily have
to have a!'). all-encompassing theory of "income" to
decide whether a particular item is or isn't income.
That is, one doesn't need to be able to feel certain how
all conceivable cases would be treated to rule on a
particular case; that's the genius of the common law.
My point in mentioning these old cases isn't to argue
that the reasoning or results were necessarily right oneby-one. I'm citing the cases for the proposition that the
early understanding was that the Sixteenth Amendment didn't grant unlimited power to Congress. The
Court consistently rejected the idea that the meaning
of the term "incomes" - in the words of Professors
Cabinet and Coffey - ought "to float freely on the
shifting tides of tax theologies." 57 Despite all the difficulties that can arise in categorizing cases at the margin, I would be very surprised to have the Court today
subscribe to the notion that Congress can define a constitutional term however Congress wishes.
5. It's not impossible to distinguish consumption
and income taxes. It's true that the Supreme Court
hasn't heard a lot of Sixteenth_Amendment cases
recently, but that doesn't mean defining "incomes" is
a hopeless project. This has unfortunately become a
common method of legal argument: drawing lines is
difficult, and, if a line is drawn, some cases at the
margin may be wrongly decided. Moreover, we can
always come up with difficult, marginal cases. Therefore (the argument goes) meaningful distinctions can't
be made at all. Because some people have trouble distinguishing Playboy and Penthouse for First Amendment purposes, many wind up deciding that no legally
meaningful lines can be drawn between The New York
Times and Hustler.
I'm not saying we should necessarily draft a rule
that treats the Times and Hustler differently. I'm suggesting only that the difficulty of making distinctions
at the margin shouldn't blind us to our ability to distinguish quite different phenomena.
That we might fight about whether a particular
taxed item is really part of a "tax on incomes" doesn't
mean that there are no important distinctions to be
drawn between income taxes and consumption taxes.

54
The challenge was to the part of section 83 that defines
the lapse of a restriction as a taxable event in some circumstances.
55
Sakol v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 986, 991, aff' d 574 F.2d 694,
699, cert. denied 439 U.S. 859 (1978).
56
The Court still cites Macomber as if the case means something. See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S.
554, 563 (1991).
57
Leon Gabinet & Ronald J. Coffey, "The Implications of
the Economic Concept of' Income for Corporation-Shareholder Income Tax Systems/' 27 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 895, 919
(1977).
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Those two types or taxes nave oeen 1:reateu a.1::1 .Lu.udamentally different in the United States for a long
time, and the distinctions aren't ones that can be abolished by congressional fiat.
6. The assumption that Congress has unlimited
power to define 'incomes' has been based on the assumption that Congress would broaden the income
tax base. To this point, I've been questioning the
proposition that the term "incomes" is so inherently
malleable that Congress can define the term however
it wants. I'll now briefly shift gears.

I would be very surprised to have the
Court today subscribe to the notion
that Congress can define a
constitutional term however Congress
wishes.
Deference to Congress in characterizing a tax as an
income tax isn't a principle I'm happy with, but you
know what? It really doesn't matter with the directconsumption taxes we're talking about because Congress

wouldn't purport to be defining the tax base as "incomes."
Put another way: we don't need to defer to a congressional definition of "incomes" if Congress doesn't say
it's defining "incomes," or if Congress does say it's
defining incomes but is engaging in a subterfuge.
It's my impression that most commentators who
have stressed how broad the congressional taxing
power is have assumed that Congress would make a
good-faith effort to define "incomes." That's true of
Thuronyi and Kornhauser, the commentators I quoted
on the "inherently malleable" point. 58 Take away that
assumption, and the case for deference disappears.
Congress knows the flat tax and the USA tax aren't
income taxes, or it will before a vote is taken. We'll
make sure of that in our debates on these proposals.
As a result, Congress shouldn't be able ,to rely on the
Sixteenth Amendment as authority to enact a directconsumption tax.
In addition, those who have argued that the term
"taxes on incomes" is inherently malleable- or something similar- have assumed that Congress would act
to broaden the definition of income. When Professor
Kornhauser refers to a "broad and evolutionary" notion of income- as "congressional conceptions of income change and become more sophisticated"- she
doesn't have in mind shrinking the tax base. 59 She

58

See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
See supra note 17 and accompanying text. If nothing else,
this discussion illustrates some of the peculiarities that arise
from treating constitutional and legislative definitions of "income" as if they necessarily coincide. What does it mean to
say that Congress defines "incomes" under the Sixteenth
Amendment? It can't be that Congress defines the constitutional terms in a way that has effect on other governmental
bodies or even on Congress itself. If Congress were to cut
59

(Footnote 59 continued on next page.)
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doesn't have in mind, that is, a tax like any of the
proposed direct-consumption taxes.
For example, in a number of articles, Professor
Kornhauser sees "ability to pay" (particularly as
reflected in a progressive rate structure) as a defining
feature of the income tax: "[T]he graduated rate has
been integrally connected under U.S. tax laws to the
ability-to-pay theory that underlies the income tax." 60
[A] progressive rate structure has been a constant
feature of the income tax since 1913, when the
first income tax was enacted under the Sixteenth
Amendment. At that time, most of the general
public, politicians and economists accepted the
idea of progressivity (though they disagreed as
to the appropriate rates) because it conformed to
their conception of 'ability to pay,' which was the
basis of the income tax. 61
And Victor Thuronyi has commented:
An issue that has been important in the past, and
may become important in the future if Congress
becomes more creative with the income tax, is the
definition of 'income' as used in the Sixteenth
Amendment. ... [I]t may be appropriate to base
. the definition of income for purposes of the Constitution on tax equity. A constitutional definition
of income in terms of tax equity would recognize
that as long as Congress is striving to impose a tax

based on the relative annual financial positions of
taxpayers, according to its concept of fairness, the
Court should not overturn its determinations. 62
If Congress isn't trying to do that, it seems to me the

inference from Kornhauser's and Thuronyi's discussions is clear. 63

back on the meaning of income, I can't believe that anyone
would say that the narrow definition had constitutional
status. Congress can't tie its own hands in the future by
defining "incomes" narrowly today, or can it?
60
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, "The Rise of Rhetoric in Tax
Reform Debate: An Example," 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2345, 2347
(1996).
61
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, "What Do Women Want:
Feminism and the Progressive Income Tax," 47 Am. U. L. Rev.
151, 152 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
62
Thuronyi, supra note 14, at 99-100 (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
63
0f course, one might argue that the term "taxes on incomes" has no content at all, and that the state of the law is
such that, whatever the language of the Sixteenth Amendment, Congress can do whatever it wants. Professor Ackerman has recently done just that: "Under the constitutional
regime inaugurated by the New Deal, there are no significant
limits on the national government's taxing, spending, and
regulatory power where the economy is concerned .... "Ackerman, supra note 3, at 3. And, with respect to the Sixteenth
Amendment, he brushes aside the idea that we should try to
figure out what "taxes on incomes" means: "When the People
mobilize to overrule the Court, it seems particularly inappropriate for the Justices to respond in a niggling fashion."
Id. at 55. In particular, Ackerman picks up on Holmes's dissent in Eisner v. Macomber, to the effect that "[t]he known
purpose of the [Sixteenth] Amendment was to get rid of nice
questions as to what might be direct taxes." Macomber, 252
(Footnote 63 continued in next column.)
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Conclusion

if I may be pardoned for saying so,
is a tax on income. "64
Those words of Lord Macnaghten, in London County
Council v. Attorney-General, written in 1900, obviously
can't be direct authority iR interpreting the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. It's an English case, interpreting a passage
from a century-old English revenue act. 65 But to my
mind those words suggest the appropriate method of
analysis in determining whether a tax is a "tax on
incomes,'' and they suggest that not every levy is a tax
on incomes.
"Income tax,

Policymakers who proceed as if there
were no constitutional issues
associated with direct-consumption
taxes do so at their - and ultimately
our- peril.
I've presented some evidence that both historically
and currently commentators have tended to think of
income taxes and consumption taxes as fundamentally
different. It is for that reason I question the generally
held assumption that a consumption tax could be
enacted, without apportionment, under the authority
of the Sixteenth Amendment.
Of course, this conclusion is only as good as the :
assumptions that I made for purposes of this discussion. If a direct-consumption tax isn't a direct tax,
within the meaning of the Constitution, or if the directtax apportionment rule is a dead letter, then any debate
about the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment is irrelevant to the consideration of direct-consumption
taxes.
U.S. at 219-20 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Ackerman, supra
note 3, at 45; see also Kahn, supra note 12, at 139 (also approvingly citing Holmes's dissent). Suffice it to say for present
purposes that Ackerman's sweeping statements aren't based
on constitutional text or structure; his interpretation of the
Sixteenth Amendment makes sense only if we ignore the
Amendment's language. Moreover, Justice Holmes cited no
authority or evidence in support of his Macomber dissent.
That fact reduces Professor Ackerman to making the bizarre
argument that we should defer to Holmes because "we can
never recapture the directness of his lived experience of the
[Sixteenth Amendment's] ratification campaign." Ackerman,
supra note 3, at 45; see also id. at 45-46 ("[WJe are left with
Holmes's ipse dixits concerning original understanding
certainly an important resource, but one that may be too
easily dismissed by readers who have not themselves lived
through the process of amendment ratification."). Why
Holmes's "lived experience" during Sixteenth Amendment
ratification was superior to the experiences of the Macomber
Court's majority is never explained.
64
London Co. Council v. Attorney-General, [1901] A.C. 26, 35
(H.L.) (Lord Macnaghten).
65
The language was "upon payment of any interest of
money or annuities charged with income tax under Sched. D
and not payable or not wholly payable out of profits or gains
brought into charge to such tax."
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But if direct-consumption taxes are direct taxes as I think they are - and if the apportionment rule still
has effect - as I think it does - then the con'stitutionality of direct-consumption taxes hinges on
the meaning of "taxes on incomes" in the Sixteenth
Amendment. If nothing else, I hope I've shown why

it's not self-evident that a direct-consumption tax is
exempt from the apportionment requirement.
Policymakers who proceed as if there were no constitutional issues associated with direct-consumption taxes
do so at their- and ultimately our- peril.
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